However, a reasonable solution is apparent, because that thing is the per se cause of something on which, when it is posited, and when any other thing has been excluded or varied, the effect follows. ƿ Hoc sic probatur secundo quia non tantum in 'induci' sed in 'permanere': aliqua forma violenter permanet in passo sine actione extrinseca licet non diu, aliqua naturaliter et diu, aliqua manet naturalis, aliqua supernaturalis, propter agens tantum, ita quod circumscribendo agens a quo fit non posset dici supernaturalis posset autem dici naturalis, quia perficit naturaliter, comparando formam ad receptivum tantum. Probatur, quia passo et forma manentibus in sua ratione (puta quod forma sit receptibilis, contra tamen inclinationem passi), quomodocumque varietur agens, passum violenter recipit similiter, passo et agente sic se habentibus quod solum agens non naturaliter activum transmutet passum (solum, inquam, ita quod agens naturale non disponat), quamcumque formam inducet erit supernaturalis respectu passi. Nunc autem licet forma contra quam inclinatur receptivum non inducatur nisi per agens violentans passum, nec agens supernaturale agat supernaturaliter nisi inducendo formam, tamen per se ratio 'violenti' est ex habitudine passi ad formam, et per se ratio 'supernaturalis' est ex habitudine passi ad agens. ĥ9 Sed solutio rationabilis apparet, quia illud est per se causa alicuius, quo posito, circumscripto vel variato quocumque alio, sequitur effectus. But these arguments are not set down here. Before this distinction is applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But if the receiver is compared with the agent from which it receives the form, then the case is natural when the receiver is compared with such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but supernatural when the receiver is compared with an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.ĥ8 $aAntequam haec distinctio ad propositum applicetur, contra istud arguitur multipliciter: tam quod distinctio 'naturalis' et ƿ 'violenti' sumatur ex comparatione passi ad agens et non tantum ex comparatione eius ad formam, quam quod distinctio 'naturalis' et 'supernaturalis' sumatur ex comparatione passi ad formam et non tantum ex respectu eius ad agens. But when the comparison is taken in this way there is nothing supernatural in it. It is called natural if it is naturally inclined to receive what it receives, violent if it does so against nature, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form which it receives nor to the opposite form. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. For a receptive power is compared with the act that it receives or with the agent from which it receives it. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural. Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quo recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum.ĥ7. In hac autem comparatione nulla est supernaturalitas. Naturalis dicitur si naturaliter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passi, neutra si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam recipit neque ad oppositam. Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recipit. 57 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur supernaturale.
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